Executive Board remuneration

Remuneration system

The Supervisory Board of KION GROUP AG is responsible for setting and regularly reviewing the total pay of the individual members of the Executive Board. According to the rules of procedure for the Supervisory Board, the Executive Committee prepares all Supervisory Board resolutions pertaining to remuneration.

The remuneration system described below has applied to the members of the KION GROUP AG Executive Board since 29 June 2013, the day after KION GROUP AG’s successful IPO and listing on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It was approved by the Annual General Meeting of KION GROUP AG on 19 May 2014 with a majority of 98.77 per cent. The Supervisory Board of the former KION Holding 1 GmbH had approved this system by adopting a resolution at its meeting on 25 April 2013 in connection with the Company’s conversion into a public limited company. This resolution was based on the recommendation of what was then the Human Resources Committee.

Essential features of the Executive Board remuneration system

The remuneration of the Executive Board of KION GROUP AG is determined in accordance with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act and the DCGK and is focused on the Company’s long-term growth. It is determined so as to reflect the size and complexity of the KION Group, its business and financial situation, its performance and future prospects, the normal amount and structure of executive board remuneration in comparable companies and the internal salary structure. The Supervisory Board also takes into account the relationship between the Executive Board remuneration and the remuneration paid to senior managers and the German workforce of the Company as a whole, including changes over the course of time. To this end, the Supervisory Board has decided how the relevant benchmarks are to be defined. Other criteria used to determine remuneration are the individual responsibilities and personal performance of each member of the Executive Board. To review the Executive Board’s remuneration, the Supervisory Board draws on remuneration comparisons, particularly comparisons with MDAX companies, and on recommendations from an external remuneration consultant who is independent both of the Executive Board and of the KION Group. The Supervisory Board regularly reviews the structure and appropriateness of Executive Board remuneration.

The total remuneration of the Executive Board comprises a non-performance-related salary and non-performance-related non-cash benefits, performance-related (variable) remuneration and pension entitlements. When setting the variable remuneration, the emphasis is on creating a measurement basis covering a number of years, thus providing the members of the Executive Board with an incentive to contribute to the sustained and long-term growth of the Company. The system specifically allows for possible positive and negative developments.

The regular cash remuneration for a particular year, consisting of a non-performance-related fixed annual salary and performance-related (variable) remuneration, has a heavy emphasis on performance. If the targets set by the Supervisory Board are completely missed, only the fixed salary is paid. Taking account of the cap on one-year and multiple-year variable remuneration, the cash remuneration consists of the following components in the event that the targets are significantly exceeded and the share price goes up sufficiently:

• 15 per cent fixed annual salary,
• 24 to 27 per cent one-year variable remuneration,
• 58 to 61 per cent multiple-year variable remuneration.

The variable components of the cash remuneration make up no more than 85 per cent, of which approximately two-thirds are multiple-year components. Both the one-year and the multiple-year components are linked to key performance indicators used by the KION Group to measure its success. The remuneration system is thus closely tied to the success of the Company and, with a high proportion of multiple-year variable remuneration, has a long-term focus aimed at promoting the KION Group’s growth.

The pension entitlements consist of entitlements in respect of retirement, invalidity and surviving dependants’ benefits.

Non-performance-related remuneration

The Executive Board members of KION GROUP AG receive non-performance-related remuneration in the form of a fixed annual salary (basic remuneration) and additional benefits. The fixed annual salary is paid at the end of each month in twelve equal instalments, the last payment being made for the full month in which the Executive Board service contract ends. The Supervisory Board reviews the basic remuneration at regular intervals and makes adjustments if appropriate.

The additional benefits essentially comprise use of a company car and the payment of premiums for accident insurance with benefits at a typical market level.

Additional special benefits have been agreed for Mr Quek because he has been sent from Singapore to China on foreign assignment.

Under this arrangement, Mr Quek’s remuneration is structured as if he were liable for taxes and social security contributions in Singapore. KION GROUP AG pays the taxes and social security contributions that Mr Quek incurs in China and Germany over and above the taxes that would theoretically apply in Singapore. In 2015, this additional amount totalled €1,167 thousand (2014: €404 thousand). The additional benefits also agreed with Mr Quek include the cost of trips home to Singapore for him and his family, a company car, rental payments in Xiamen, China, and private health insurance. In 2015, the additional benefits for Mr Quek amounted to a total of €158 thousand (2014: €108 thousand). These additional benefits will be granted for as long as Mr Quek’s designated place of work is Xiamen or until his service contract with KION GROUP AG ends.

Performance-related remuneration

The performance-related remuneration components consist of a variable remuneration component measured over one year (short-term incentive) and a variable remuneration component measured over several years in the form of a rolling performance share plan with a three-year term (long-term incentive).

One-year variable remuneration

The one-year variable remuneration is a remuneration component linked to the business profitability and productivity of the KION Group in the relevant financial year. Its amount is determined by the achievement of the following targets:

• earnings before interest, tax and amortisation (EBITA), weighting of 30 per cent,
• return on capital employed (ROCE), weighting of 30 per cent,
• revenue, weighting of 20 per cent and
• net debt, weighting of 20 per cent.

The target values for the financial components are derived from the annual budget and specified by the Supervisory Board.

No bonus is paid if target achievement is 75 per cent or less (lower target limit). In cases where the targets are significantly exceeded, the bonus can be doubled at most (capped at 200 per cent). If the targets derived from the annual budget are achieved in full, target achievement is 100 per cent. The target achievement levels for the weighted targets (EBITA, ROCE, revenue and net debt) are added together to give the total target achievement.

The individual performance of the Executive Board members is assessed by the Supervisory Board, which applies a discretionary performance multiple with a factor of between 0.8 and 1.2. When deciding what factor to apply, the Supervisory Board looks at the extent to which the Executive Board members have achieved the individual targets set by the Supervisory Board at the start of the year. This factor enables the Supervisory Board to increase or reduce the bonus, calculated on the basis of the total target achievement for the financial targets derived from the budget, by a maximum of 20 per cent depending on the assessment of individual performance. The one-year variable remuneration is capped at 200 per cent of the contractual target bonus and is paid after the Annual General Meeting relating to the year in question.

In the event that an Executive Board member is not entitled to remuneration for the entire year on which the calculation is based, the remuneration is reduced pro rata temporis.

Multiple-year variable remuneration

For the members of the Executive Board, multiple-year variable remuneration has been agreed in the form of a performance share plan. A very similar plan is offered to the Group’s senior managers. The basis of measurement has been defined as the total shareholder return (TSR) for KION shares compared with the STOXX^® Europe Total Market Index (TMI) Industrial Engineering Index and return on capital employed (ROCE). Each has a weighting of 50 per cent. The annual tranches granted under the plan have a term (performance period) of three years and are paid at the end of the term, provided the defined targets have been achieved.

At the start of a performance period, a conditional entitlement to a certain target number of performance shares is granted. This preliminary number is calculated by dividing the allocation value set out (in euros) in the service contract for the particular Executive Board member by the fair value of one performance share at the time of grant. At the end of the performance period, the preliminary number of performance shares is adjusted depending on achievement of the two targets (relative TSR and ROCE) to give the final number of performance shares.

In respect of the ROCE target, there is no entitlement if target achievement is 75 per cent or less. If the target is significantly exceeded (target achievement of 135 per cent or more), the entitlement is capped at 150 per cent. Regarding the relative TSR target, there is no entitlement if KION shares do not outperform the STOXX^® Europe TMI Industrial Engineering Index. If the KION shares outperform this index by 15 per cent or more, the entitlement is capped at 150 per cent. If KION shares outperform the STOXX^® Europe TMI Industrial Engineering index by 10 per cent and the ROCE targets defined each year on the basis of the budget are achieved, total target achievement will be 100 per cent.

The amount paid for each tranche is determined by the final number of performance shares multiplied by the price of KION shares (average price over the preceding 60 trading days) at the end of the performance period.

Executive Board members’ individual performance is also taken into account in the multiple-year variable remuneration. At the start of the performance period, the Supervisory Board defines individual targets for the three-year period. Depending on achievement of these targets, the Supervisory Board can apply a discretionary factor to make a final adjustment to the calculation of the amount to be paid out at the end of the performance period by plus or minus 20 per cent, although the maximum payment may not exceed 200 per cent of the allocation value.

The plan is a cash-settled long-term incentive plan that does not include the right to receive any actual shares. Under the requirements of German accounting standard (GAS) 17 and IFRS 2, the total expense arising from share-based payments and the fair value of the performance share plan on the date of granting must be disclosed. > TABLE 006

The total expense in 2015 amounted to €11,203 thousand (2014: €4,782 thousand).This does not include an amount of €531 thousand already recognised as an expense in 2014 in connection with the termination agreements of Mr Knoef and Mr Maurer.

Upper limits on remuneration

In accordance with the DCGK, remuneration is subject to upper limits on the amounts payable, both overall and also in terms of the variable components. The upper limit on the total cash remuneration to be paid, consisting of the fixed annual salary plus the one-year and multiple-year variable remuneration, equals 1.7 times the target remuneration (2014: 1.7 times) – excluding the non-performance-related non-cash remuneration and other benefits paid in that financial year. Both the one-year and multiple-year variable remuneration are capped at 200 per cent of the target value.

Pension entitlements

KION GROUP AG grants its Executive Board members direct entitlement to a company pension plan consisting of retirement, invalidity and surviving dependants’ benefits.

The Chief Executive Officer has a defined benefit entitlement that was granted in his original service contract and was transferred to his Executive Board service contract when the Company changed its legal form. The amount of the entitlement is dependent on the number of years of service and amounts to a maximum of 50 per cent of the most recent fixed annual salary awarded in the original service contract after the end of the tenth year of service.

The present value of the previous defined benefit plan for the ordinary members of the Executive Board was transferred as a starting contribution for a new defined contribution pension plan when the Company changed its legal form. The new plan is structured as a cash balance plan and is also applied to new Executive Board members.

For each of the other ordinary members of the Executive Board, a fixed annual contribution of €150 thousand (€124.5 thousand for Mr Quek) is paid into their pension accounts for the duration of the member’s period of service on the Executive Board. Interest is paid on the pension account at the prevailing statutory guaranteed return rate for the life insurance industry (applicable maximum interest rate for the calculation of the actuarial reserves of life insurers pursuant to section 2 (1) German Regulation on the Principles Underlying the Calculation of the Premium Reserve (DeckRV)) until an insured event occurs. If higher interest is generated by investing the pension account, it will be credited to the pension account when an insured event occurs (surplus). The standard retirement age for the statutory pension applies. Executive Board members are entitled to early payment of the pension no earlier than their 62nd birthday. In the event of invalidity or death while the Executive Board member has an active service contract, the contributions that would have been made until the age of 60 are added to the pension account, although only a maximum of ten annual contributions will be added. When an insured event occurs, the pension is paid as a lump sum or, following a written request, in ten annual instalments.

Termination benefits

In line with the DCGK, all Executive Board service contracts provide for a severance payment equivalent to no more than two years’ annual remuneration payable in the event of the contract being terminated prematurely without good cause. The amount of annual remuneration is defined as fixed salary plus the variable remuneration elements, assuming 100 per cent target achievement and excluding non-cash benefits and other additional benefits, for the last full financial year before the end of the Executive Board service contract. If the Executive Board service contract was due to end within two years, the severance payment is calculated pro rata temporis. If a service contract is terminated for good cause for which the Executive Board member concerned is responsible, no payments are made to the Executive Board member in question. The Company does not have any commitments for the payment of benefits in the event of a premature termination of Executive Board contracts following a change of control.

Executive Board members are subject to a post-contractual non-compete agreement of one year. In return, the Company pays the Executive Board member compensation for the duration of the non-compete agreement amounting to 100 per cent of his final fixed salary. Other income of the Executive Board member is offset against the compensation.

In the event that Mr Riske’s appointment is not extended for reasons for which he is not responsible and he has not reached the standard retirement age for the statutory pension or in the event that Mr Riske resigns for good cause before the end of his appointment or suffers permanent incapacity after his period of service as a result of sickness, he will receive transitional benefits of €276 thousand per annum on the basis of previous contracts. During his current term of office, the amount of the transitional benefits will rise by €12 thousand each year up to a maximum amount of €300 thousand per annum. Severance payments in the event of early termination of his appointment without good cause, compensation for the post-contractual non-compete agreement, pension benefits that Mr Riske receives due to his previous work for other employers and income from other use of his working capacity (with the exception of remuneration for work as a member of a supervisory or advisory board or a board of directors) will be offset against these transitional benefits.

If an Executive Board member suffers temporary incapacity, he will receive his full fixed salary for a maximum period of six months plus the one-year variable remuneration. In the event of temporary incapacity for a further six months, the Executive Board member will receive 80 per cent of his fixed salary, but only up to a point at which the service contract is terminated.

If an Executive Board member ceases to be employed by the Company as a result of death, the Executive Board member’s family will be entitled to the fixed monthly remuneration for the month in which the service contract ends and for the three subsequent months, but only up to the point at which the service contract would otherwise have come to an end.

Remuneration for members of the Executive Board in 2015

In accordance with the recommendations of the DCGK, as amended on 5 May 2015, the remuneration of Executive Board members is presented in two separate tables. Firstly, the benefits granted for the year under review, including the additional benefits and – in the case of variable remuneration components – the maximum and minimum remuneration achievable are shown. > TABLE 007

Secondly, > TABLE 008 shows the total remuneration allocated / earned, comprising fixed remuneration, short-term variable remuneration and long-term variable remuneration, broken down by reference year.

Benefits granted pursuant to the DCGK

The total remuneration granted to Executive Board members for 2015 was €9,535 thousand (minimum: €3,194 thousand, maximum: €15,877 thousand) (2014: €11,840 thousand). Of this amount, €2,098 thousand (2014: €2,840 thousand) was attributable to fixed non-performance-related remuneration components, €6,372 thousand (minimum: €31 thousand, maximum: €12,713 thousand) (2014: €7,911 thousand) to variable one-year and multiple-year performance-related remuneration components, €211 thousand (2014: €175 thousand) to non-performance-related non-cash remuneration and other non-performance-related benefits, and €854 thousand (2014: €914 thousand) to the pension expense. The figure shown for one-year variable remuneration is based on a target achievement rate of 100 per cent (minimum: 0 per cent for target achievement of 75 per cent or less, maximum: 200 per cent for target achievement of 135 per cent or more). The figure shown for multiple-year variable remuneration is the fair value of the performance share plans at the date of grant, representing full target achievement (minimum: zero payment, maximum: 200 per cent of the contractual allocation value).

The additional benefits were measured at the value calculated for tax purposes. > TABLE 007

Gordon Riske

Dr Eike Böhm

Bert-Jan Knoef

Theodor Maurer

Ching Pong Quek

Dr Thomas Toepfer

Allocation pursuant to the DCGK

The total remuneration allocated to / earned by Executive Board members for 2015 was €15,199 thousand (2014: €8,156 thousand). Of this amount, €2,098 thousand (2014: €2,840 thousand) was attributable to fixed non-performance-related remuneration components, €12,036 thousand (2014: €4,227 thousand) to variable one-year and multiple-year performance-related remuneration components, €211 thousand (2014: €175 thousand) to non-performance-related non-cash remuneration and other non-performance-related benefits, and €854 thousand (2014: €914 thousand) to the pension expense. The figure shown for one-year variable remuneration is based on a preliminary total target achievement rate of about 114 per cent calculated using preliminary earnings figures at the beginning of 2016. In departure from this, the value for Mr Knoef and Mr Maurer was the value defined in their termination agreements. This preliminary variable remuneration for each Executive Board member is also subject to adjustment by the Supervisory Board in line with the individual performance of the Executive Board member. This adjustment may vary by plus or minus 20 per cent of the variable remuneration.

As part of the multiple-year remuneration, the first payment from the 2013 tranche of the performance share plan will be made in spring 2016 on the basis of the achievement of the long-term targets that were defined in 2013 at the start of the performance period. The value shown for 2015 is also calculated on the basis of a preliminary total target achievement rate of 122 per cent and is subject to the performance-based adjustment by a discretionary performance multiple made by the Supervisory Board for individual Executive Board members. As is the case for the one-year variable remuneration, this performance-based adjustment may vary by plus or minus 20 per cent.

The additional benefits were measured at the value calculated for tax purposes. > TABLE 008

Gordon Riske

Dr Eike Böhm

Bert-Jan Knoef

Theodor Maurer

Ching Pong Quek

Dr Thomas Toepfer

The total payments made to former members of the Executive Board in 2015 in connection with the termination of their Executive Board service contracts amounted to €8,423 thousand. An appropriate provision was recognised for these payments in 2014.

These payments consisted of a non-performance-related salary and non-performance-related non-cash benefits, performance-related remuneration and pension entitlements.

Mr Knoef’s total amount of €4,381 thousand breaks down into a non-performance-related component of €4,031 thousand, a performance-related component without a long-term incentive of €84 thousand, a performance-related component with a long-term incentive – for the 2013 tranche based on a preliminary total target achievement – of €164 thousand and pension expenses of €101 thousand.

Mr Maurer’s total amount of €4,042 thousand breaks down into a non-performance-related component of €3,686 thousand, a performance-related component without a long-term incentive of €84 thousand, a performance-related component with a long-term incentive – for the 2013 tranche based on a preliminary total target achievement – of €164 thousand and pension expenses of €107 thousand.

The table below shows the pension contributions (additions to the plan) attributable to each individual Executive Board member and their separate present values. > TABLE 009

In addition to the remuneration described above for Mr Knoef and Mr Maurer, the total remuneration paid to former members of the Executive Board amounted to €230 thousand in 2015 (2014: €210 thousand). Provisions for defined benefit obligations to former members of the Executive Board or their surviving dependants amounting to €8,758 thousand (2014: €6,082 thousand) were recognised in accordance with IAS 19.

In the year under review, no advances were made to members of the Executive Board, and there were no loans.