II. The components of Executive Board remuneration in detail

A. Non-performance-related remuneration

1) Fixed salary and additional benefits

The Executive Board members of KION GROUP AG receive non-performance-related remuneration in the form of a fixed annual salary (basic remuneration) and additional benefits. The fixed annual salary is paid at the end of each month in twelve equal instalments, the last payment being made for the full month in which the Executive Board service contract ends. The Supervisory Board reviews the basic remuneration at regular intervals and makes adjustments if appropriate.

The additional benefits essentially comprise use of a company car and the payment of premiums for accident insurance with benefits at a typical market level.

2) Additional special benefits

Additional special benefits have been agreed for Mr Quek because he has been sent from Singapore to China on foreign assignment.

Under this arrangement, Mr Quek’s remuneration is structured as if he were liable for taxes and social security contributions in Singapore. KION GROUP AG pays the taxes and social security contributions that Mr Quek incurs in China and Germany over and above the taxes that would theoretically apply in Singapore. In 2019, this additional amount totalled €496 thousand (2018: €420 thousand). The additional benefits also agreed with Mr Quek include the cost of trips home to Singapore for him and his family, a company car, rental payments in Xiamen, China, and private health insurance. In 2019, the additional benefits for Mr Quek amounted to a total of €135 thousand (2018: €136 thousand). These additional benefits will be granted for as long as Mr Quek’s designated place of work is Xiamen or until his service contract with KION GROUP AG ends.

3) Pension entitlements

KION GROUP AG grants its Executive Board members direct entitlement to a company pension plan consisting of retirement, invalidity and surviving dependants’ benefits.

The Chief Executive Officer has a defined benefit entitlement that was granted in his original service contract and was transferred to his Executive Board service contract when the Company changed its legal form. The amount of the entitlement is dependent on the number of years of service and amounts to a maximum of 50 per cent of the most recent fixed annual salary awarded in the original service contract after the end of the tenth year of service.

The present value of the previous defined benefit plan for the ordinary members of the Executive Board was transferred as a starting contribution for a new defined contribution pension plan when the Company changed its legal form. The new plan is structured as a cash balance plan and is also applied to new Executive Board members.

Fixed annual contributions of €250 thousand for Ms Groth, €150 thousand for Ms Schneeberger and Dr Böhm and €124.5 thousand for Mr Quek are paid into their pension accounts for the duration of the member’s period of service on the Executive Board. Interest is paid on the pension account at the prevailing statutory guaranteed return rate for the life insurance industry (applicable maximum interest rate for the calculation of the actuarial reserves of life insurers pursuant to section 2 (1) of the German Regulation on the Principles Underlying the Calculation of the Premium Reserve (DeckRV)) until an insured event occurs. If higher interest is generated by investing the pension account, it will be credited to the pension account when an insured event occurs (surplus). The standard retirement age for the statutory pension applies. Executive Board members are entitled to early payment of the pension no earlier than their 62nd birthday. In the event of invalidity or death while the Executive Board member has an active service contract, the contributions that would have been made until the age of 60 are added to the pension account, although only a maximum of ten annual contributions will be added. When an insured event occurs, the pension is paid as a lump sum or, following a written request, in ten annual instalments.

B. Performance-related remuneration

1) One-year variable remuneration (short-term incentive)

The one-year variable remuneration is a remuneration component linked to the profitability and productivity of the KION Group in the relevant financial year. This is the same as the arrangement in our remuneration system for senior managers. Its amount is determined by the achievement of the following targets:

• Adjusted earnings before interest and tax (adjusted EBIT), weighting of 50 per cent
• Free cash flow, weighting of 50 per cent

The target values for the financial components are derived from the annual budget and specified in target agreements between the Supervisory Board and Executive Board.

No bonus is paid if target achievement is 70 per cent or less (lower target limit). In cases where the targets are significantly exceeded (upper target limit of 130 per cent), the bonus can be doubled at most (payment cap of 200 per cent). > DIAGRAM 007

1 a) Bonus curve for the short-term incentive

If the targets derived from the annual budget are achieved in full, target achievement is 100 per cent. The target achievement levels for the weighted targets (adjusted EBIT and free cash flow) are added together to give the total target achievement.

The individual performance of the Executive Board members is assessed by the Supervisory Board, which applies a discretionary performance multiple with a factor of between 0.7 and 1.3. The main criteria used for this performance-based adjustment are growth of market share, successful innovations and the Organizational Health Index (OHI), which measures the improvement in the Company’s management culture. There are also agreements relating to special operational and, in particular, strategic projects that are very important to the Company’s long-term development. The discretionary performance multiple enables the Supervisory Board to increase or reduce the bonus, calculated on the basis of the total target achievement for the financial targets derived from the budget, by a maximum of 30 per cent depending on the assessment of individual performance. The one-year variable remuneration is capped at 200 per cent of the contractual target bonus and is paid after the annual financial statements for the year in question have been adopted. > DIAGRAM 008

1 b) Diagram showing the calculation of one-year variable remuneration (short-term incentive)

In the event that an Executive Board member is not entitled to remuneration for the entire year on which the calculation is based, the remuneration is reduced pro rata.

2) Multiple-year variable remuneration (long-term incentive)

For the members of the Executive Board, multiple-year variable remuneration has been agreed in the form of a performance share plan. A very similar plan is in place for the Group’s senior managers. The basis of measurement has been defined as the total shareholder return (TSR) for KION shares compared with the MDAX and return on capital employed (ROCE). Each has a weighting of 50 per cent. The annual tranches promised under the plan have a term (performance period) of three years and are paid at the end of the term, provided the defined targets have been achieved.

At the start of a performance period, a conditional entitlement to a certain target number of performance shares is granted. This preliminary number is calculated by dividing the allocation value set out (in euros) in the service contract for the particular Executive Board member by the share price on the relevant date at the start of the performance period. This share price, which is calculated to two decimal places, is determined from the average Xetra closing price of KION shares (closing auction prices) on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (or a successor system that replaces it) over the last 60 trading days prior to the start of the performance period.

At the end of the performance period, the preliminary number of performance shares is adjusted depending on achievement of the two targets (relative TSR and ROCE) to give the final number of performance shares.

In respect of the ROCE target, there is no entitlement if target achievement is 70 per cent or less. If the target is significantly exceeded (target achievement of 130 per cent or more), the entitlement is capped at 200 per cent. Regarding the relative TSR target, there is no entitlement if KION shares underperform the MDAX. If the KION shares outperform this index by 20 per cent or more, the entitlement is capped at 200 per cent. If KION shares outperform the MDAX by 6.67 per cent and the ROCE targets defined each year on the basis of the budget are achieved, total target achievement will be 100 per cent.

The amount paid for each tranche is determined by the final number of performance shares multiplied by the price of KION shares (average price over the preceding 60 trading days) at the end of the performance period.

Executive Board members’ individual performance is also taken into account in the multiple-year variable remuneration. At the start of the performance period, the Supervisory Board defines targets for the three-year period. For the performance share plan, the criteria used to assess individual performance are – as for the one-year variable remuneration – growth of market share, successful innovations and the Organizational Health Index (OHI), which measures the improvement in the Company’s management culture. For the LTI too, there are also agreements relating to special operational and, in particular, strategic projects that are very important to the Company’s long-term development. Depending on achievement of these targets, the Supervisory Board can apply a discretionary factor to make a final adjustment to the calculation of the amount to be paid out at the end of the performance period by plus or minus 30 per cent, although the maximum payment may not exceed 200 per cent of the allocation value. > DIAGRAMS 009 – 010.

2 a) Diagram showing the calculation of multiple-year variable remuneration (long-term incentive)

2 b) Target ranges for relative TSR and ROCE

The plan is a cash-settled long-term incentive plan that does not include the right to receive any actual shares. Under the requirements of GAS 17, IFRS 2 and the HGB, the total expense arising from share-based payments and the fair value of the performance share plan on the date of granting must be disclosed. > TABLES 029 – 031

The total expense in 2019 amounted to €4,084 thousand (2018: income of €1,763 thousand).

3) Termination benefits

In line with the DCGK, all Executive Board service contracts provide for a severance payment equivalent to no more than two years’ annual remuneration payable in the event of the contract being terminated prematurely without good cause. The amount of annual remuneration is defined as fixed salary plus the variable remuneration elements, assuming 100 per cent target achievement and excluding non-cash benefits and other additional benefits, for the last full financial year before the end of the Executive Board service contract. If the Executive Board service contract was due to end within two years, the severance payment is calculated pro rata. If a service contract is terminated for good cause for which the Executive Board member concerned is responsible, no payments are made to the Executive Board member in question. The Company does not have any commitments for the payment of benefits in the event of a premature termination of Executive Board contracts following a change of control.

Executive Board members are subject to a post-contractual non-compete agreement of one year. In return, the Company pays the Executive Board member compensation for the duration of the non-compete agreement amounting to 100 per cent of his final fixed salary. Other income of the Executive Board member is offset against the compensation.

In the event that Mr Riske’s appointment is not extended for a reason for which he is not responsible and he has not reached the standard retirement age for the statutory pension or in the event that Mr Riske resigns for good cause before the end of his appointment or suffers permanent incapacity after his period of service as a result of sickness, he will receive transitional benefits of €300 thousand per annum on the basis of previous contracts. Severance payments in the event of early termination of his appointment without good cause, compensation for the post-contractual non-compete agreement, pension benefits that Mr Riske receives due to his previous work for other employers and income from other use of his working capacity (with the exception of remuneration for work as a member of a supervisory or advisory board or a board of directors) will be offset against these transitional benefits.

If an Executive Board member suffers temporary incapacity, he will receive his full fixed salary for a maximum period of six months plus the one-year variable remuneration. In the event of temporary incapacity for a further six months, the Executive Board member will receive 80 per cent of his fixed salary, but only up to a point at which the service contract is terminated.

If an Executive Board member ceases to be employed by the Company as a result of death, the Executive Board member’s family will be entitled to the fixed monthly remuneration for the month in which the service contract ends and for the three subsequent months, but only up to the point at which the service contract would otherwise have come to an end.

4) Share ownership guidelines

In connection with the updated remuneration system for Executive Board members that has been in force since 1 January 2017, the Supervisory Board decided to introduce share ownership guidelines, under which all Executive Board members are required to hold shares worth 100 per cent of their basic remuneration. They have to build up their shareholding to this percentage and hold the shares for as long as they remain on the Executive Board. The obligation to hold the full number of shares begins no later than four years after the start of the obligation to hold shares. In the first four years, they are permitted to increase their shareholding incrementally: they must hold 25 per cent of the full number of shares no later than twelve months after the start of the obligation, 50 per cent by the end of the second year and 75 per cent by the end of the third year. The Executive Board members to whom these guidelines apply held the required number of shares as at 31 December 2019 and thus fulfilled this obligation.

The relevant number of shares is determined on the basis of the arithmetic mean (rounded to two decimal places) of the Xetra closing prices (closing auction prices) of the Company’s shares on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (or a successor system that replaces it) over the last 60 trading days prior to the start of the obligation to hold the shares and then rounded to the nearest whole number.

It is not necessary to acquire further shares once the full number of shares has been reached, nor will there be an obligation to purchase additional shares if the share price falls. There is only an obligation to purchase additional shares if there is a change to the fixed annual remuneration in the member’s Executive Board service contract or if a capital reduction, capital increase or stock split takes place.